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C

itizens of the United States are
beginning to realize that economic
prosperity also brings about political
success. The support of top corporate
elites has become one of the main deciding
factors in political elections. As politicians also
become aware of this fact, their focus tends to
gravitate toward the interests of the small
wealthy population, leaving the majority of their
constituents behind. This trend essentially
establishes a gap based on the preferences
between the rich and the poor. With this said,
the American government plays a large role in
the causes of income inequality. Consequently,
political institutions have begun to show
unequal responsiveness between high and low
income citizens. Those with low incomes are
underrepresented in American institutions,
which results in a preference gap between the
rich and the poor. The greater income
inequality present, the greater the preference gap
will be. These trends have resulted in an
overwhelming amount of unfair policy choices
in American political institutions.
In this paper, I will explore income
inequality in America as it is presently. I will
begin by examining what causes inequality and
further my analysis through examining the
implications it has on political institutions’
responsiveness, and representation. I will
observe the differing policies in which the rich
and poor favor, and examine government
responsiveness state-by-state. Through this, I
will research whether the poor are properly
represented in American institutions. In

addition, I will discuss the important role racial
inequality plays in economic inequality and
show how one is embedded in the other. There
is an apparent preference gap in American
politics, which can be seen as a direct product of
the income gap. Political parties and institutions
appeal toward specific income groups –
primarily the affluent.

INCOME INEQUALITY AND UNEQUAL
POWER

Income inequality plays a large role in the course
of American politics. In “Winner-Take-All
Politics,” authors Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson
discuss the issues of the extreme concentration
of income gains at the top of the economic
ladder. They acknowledge the role of
government policy in creating a “winner-takeall” pattern and explore the long-term
transformation of the organizational landscape
of American politics (Hacker & Pierson 2010).
They examine that the balance of political power
is sharply in favor of the extreme wealthy,
paving the way for America’s winner-take-all
inequality. Due to this extreme bias, public
policy and institutional representation tends to
lean in favor of those with high incomes.
The dramatic rise of income inequality was
not initially debated in the realm of politics.
Until recently, most of the discussion focused on
the hypothesized economic roots of rising
inequality. However, much of the research’s
criticism derived from the absence of the
relationship of inequality in American politics.
(Hacker & Pierson 2010). In the past few years,
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there have been multitudes of books and articles
written by prominent political scientists who
have begun to research the importance of this
phenomenon. Their central theses are based on
the fact that politics and public policy have
played a pertinent role in the rise of inequality,
much more than what economic accounts
suggest (Hacker & Pierson 2010). Now, both
public officials and institutions are critical
factors to examine in order to understand the
calamities of income inequality.
Hacker and Pierson believe that a
“convincing political analysis” of income
inequality must contain two essential parts. First
is staying consistent with the fact that American
inequality is “winner-take-all,” which means that
a small slice of the population is becoming
dramatically richer while the majority of the
population remains stagnant. Second, the
analysis must show the relationship between the
economic factors that set inequality and the
outcomes of public policy in American politics
(Hacker & Pierson 2010). Their research tackles
both of these areas and hinges off the fact that
although gaps have grown across the income
spectrum, the real action is at the top, especially
the very top. The top 0.01 – 1 percent of the
United States population income, which is about
the richest 150,000 or so families, are growing
quicker than the rest of the population (Hacker
& Pierson 2010). They further their hypothesis
by arguing that winner-take-all inequality
constitutes from public policies that have
enhanced economic rewards only for those at
the top of the economic ladder. This requires
looking closely at various mechanisms in which
organized interests attempt to influence
authority for personal needs.
Income inequality could be measured in
several ways. In Hacker and Pierson’s study on
Winner-Take- All Politics, they base their
statistics on pretax income earned in order to
rate levels on inequality (Hacker & Pierson
2010). However, in this case, the use of the Gini
index would work best in order to determine the
relationship between income and shares in the
population. The Gini index specifically
“measures the extent to which the distribution of
income among individuals or households within

an economy deviates from a perfectly equal
distribution” (World Bank 2016). This index
ranges from values of zero, indicating perfect
equality, to one, implying perfect inequality.
Therefore, if the Gini index coefficient is greater,
the more concentrated the nation’s wealth will
be toward the top.
According to data retrieved from 2012 from
the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), the United States
has a Gini coefficient of 0.390, which ranks them
29th compared to 30 other developed countries
only placing ahead of Turkey and Mexico. In
order to understand how this coefficient affects
inequality, one must examine the Gini index
before and after taxes and transfers (OECD
2016). This research is not intended to go into
an in depth analysis of taxes and transfers
however, it important to see where the United
States stands in regards to the Gini Index.
Like any study, it is important to understand
why this topic matters. While this is an evident
problem in the United States now more than any
other country in the world, understanding why
this trend should be fixed is crucial. To start,
more Americans are continuing to see greater
divergence in the standards of living between the
middle-class, poor, and wealthy. As one may
assume, people in the lowest-income group
“express less financial satisfaction now than at
any time in the last 25 years” (Pew 2012).
However, one must examine why the poor are
poor. Forty-six percent of a population say that
the reason they are poor are due to
circumstances beyond one’s control (Pew 2012).
Although a majority of Americans believe that
hard work pays off in economic success, there is
no doubt that people simply become
discouraged due to their lack of belief in social
mobility, or ability to move within a social
hierarchy (“social mobility”). In a different
study conducted by OECD, they found a
correlation between high inequality and lower
social mobility rates. Therefore, countries with
lower Gini indexes such as Denmark, Germany,
and Finland will have greater social mobility,
whereas the United States will have less due to
their high rates of wealth inequality (OECD
2014).
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Along these same lines, inequality can also
have an effect on education. This comes to show
that this trend is not only an economic issue, but
a social one as well. A highly skewed distribution
of wealthy can be lethal to an overall growth of
society, especially if it means unequal
opportunity for new generations to come
(Hacker & Pierson 2010). This affect will not
only continue the movement of inequality in the
future, it will lead these social classes to become
more polarized than they already are. Hacker
and Pierson also address the issue that the
educated elite is not the same as the economic
elite. Those at the top are often highly educated,
but so too are those below them on the
economic ladder who have been left behind.
Only a small portion of the educated elite has
entered the new economic elite (Hacker &
Pierson 2010).
Subsequently, the shift of income toward the
top has been increasing steadily since around
1980. The gap between the wealthy and poor is
now the highest since the 1940s. This is due to
the matter that gains at the very top were not
accompanied by significant gains for those at the
bottom of the income ladder (Hacker & Pierson
2010). Based on the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), there is few “trickle down” benefits for
most of the population. These gains have been
sustained, and growing steadily without
interruption since. Hacker and Pierson make an
important note that the growing share of
national income captured by the richest
Americans is not related to either the business
cycle or the shifting occupation of the White
House (Hacker & Pierson 2010). Therefore, this
entails that the causes and solutions could be
found in other areas such as public policy.
Larry Bartels’ Unequal Democracy explains
how the widening gap between the rich and the
poor resulted in unfair policy choices in the
political system. Hacker and Pierson agree with
Bartels’ notion that because the wealthy are able
to contribute to the political system, citizens of
higher incomes see more policy initiatives in
their favor (Bartels 2008). However, they
criticize Bartels failure to include the incomes of
the top 1% in his research. Hacker and Pierson’s
research hinges off the fact that the 1% of the

wealthiest people make more money that the rest
of the population combined (Hacker & Pierson
2010). They believe that leaving out this vital
information is essential to completely
understanding how income inequality has direct
consequences on unfair public policy and
representation in the American political system.
In public policy, citizens envision their
government to act on behalf of society as a whole
by weighing the interests of both the rich and the
poor equally. The problems that income
inequality poses on the fairness of the political
system directly affects the nature of its
democracy (Bartels 2008). The United States was
built upon the framework of core democratic
values that unite all Americans despite where
one stands financially. It provides each citizen
with equal rights such as life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. If citizens at the top of the
income ladder are able to have a greater say in
the political scene than those at the bottom, is
the U.S. able to maintain the fairness of its
democracy? Political scientists such as Bartels
and Martin Gilens ask this question in order to
understand the political implications of income
inequality.
Similar to Hacker and Pierson, Bartels
acknowledges that the deep issue of income
disparity in the United States is not simply an
economic one, but “in substantial part, a
political phenomenon” (Bartels 2008). To back
up this claim, he examines the income trends
between the rich and the poor from President
Truman’s administration to President George
W. Bush. Bartels focuses on how Democrats and
Republicans either cause or effect the rise of
inequality in America through policy trends. He
concludes by showing how inequality
historically rises under Republican
administrations, and under Democratic
presidents, “poor families did slightly better than
richer families” (Bartels 2008). He specifically
notes that under Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon,
Ford, Reagan, and both Bushes, the income gap
increased, while it declined under all the
Democratic presidents except Jimmy Carter.
Both Hacker and Pierson agree with Bartels that
this was “not a mere coincidence in the timing of
Democratic and Republican presidents.” Instead,
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this shows how the “two parties pursue different
economic agendas, while appealing to two
separate income groups” (Bartels 2008).
Historically, Democrats focus on policies
such as lowering unemployment and output
growth, while also looking to raise social
expenditures. These trends undoubtedly and
disproportionately benefit poor and middle-class
families over wealthier ones (Balz 2008). On the
other hand, Republican administrations look
toward amending fiscal policies such as
containing inflation rates and tax policy. One
can immediately point out that these policies are
insignificant to those with lower incomes.
Bartels notes that the Republicans’ fiscal policies
have inconsequential effects on real income
growth for those citizens near the bottom of the
income distribution but “substantial effects at
the top” (Balz 2008). In regards to tax policy,
Republicans have historically been more
inclined to push for tax cuts that would support
the wealthy, while exploiting the majority of the
tax-paying population.
While Republicans undoubtedly receive its
main support from its wealthy constituents, it is
important to question why Republicans also
receive a substantial amount of support from
white lower- to middle- class citizens as well.
Bartels makes a strong approximation by stating
that, “the net decline in Democratic
identification among poor whites over the past
half-century is entirely attributable to the demise
of the Solid South as a Democratic allegiance”
(Bartels 2008). Since 1952, the South’s
Democratic identification went from 46 percent
to negative 6 percent in 2004. As a result of this
data, is it safe to assume that working-class
whites have become more conservative in their
politics? Bartels brings up an interesting point as
to one reason why this trend is occurring.
Republicans have succeeded in shifting the focus
of political debates from economic issues, where
low-income voters are generally relatively
liberal, to cultural issues, where they are
generally relatively conservative (Bartels 2008).
More politicians are finding ways to downplay
the politics of economic for reelection and
favorability purposes, which finds that culture
seems to outweigh economic as a principle

public concern. Bartels states that due to these
conservative culture preferences, the white
working-class have reluctantly accepted the
Republican economic agenda as “part of the
package” (Bartels 2008).
In a recent article written by Jacob Hacker
and Paul Pierson, they predict the effects that the
Trump administration’s tax cuts will have on
income inequality. As previously mentioned,
there is an evident red-state vs. blue-state bias in
politics. As a result, parties generally try to favor
segments of society that will support them
(Hacker & Pierson 2017). As briefly noted
earlier, Republican economic agenda usually
revolves around tax cuts for the wealthy;
however, this does not equate to Republicans
redistributing its wealth back to states that
support it. Republicans’ bias toward big business
and rich donors fit the exact policy patterns in
which they support. However, the issue with
Trump’s administration is that those who are the
main beneficiaries of the Republican tax bill no
longer reside in the prevalent in red states.
Instead, this deep party divide and new spoils
system does not just corrupt our policies, but
“cripple the economic future” of the United
States (Hacker & Pierson 2017).
In order to support this claim, in his work,
Bartels examines the election of 2000 between
George W. Bush and Al Gore. Income inequality
trends show that the top 5 percent of the
wealthiest families saw an increase in real
income during President Bush’s first four years
as president. Consequently, middle and lowincome families saw a decline of 3 percent in real
income (Bartels 2008). Interestingly, Bartels then
uses a hypothetical example to show what it
would be like if Al Gore had been elected in
2000. Based on historical data, he found that the
middle and low-income citizens would have
seen an increase of 6 percent, while the wealthy
would have remained stagnant with essentially
no gain (Balz 2008). Bartels shows how the
differing economic agendas of the two parties
ultimately signals the rise of the preference gap
in American politics.
It has become apparent that most policy
initiatives that affect the majority of the people
are driven by the political power of the wealthy.
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Those at the top of the income bracket are able
to have a significant amount of political
influence through campaign financing and other
forms of donations. Top corporate elites, such as
CEOs and hedge fund managers, are typically
supporting bills or policies that benefit their
personal needs rather than society as a whole. As
a result of this, policy and legislation coming out
of Congress is usually skewed in favor toward
the top producers of income. These private
troubles warrant significant public issues due to
the fact that public policy is no longer created
for the greater majority of Americans, but
instead for specific groups in the population
(Bartels 2008).
There are various reasons as to why
politicians may seek the agendas of the wealthy
before those of lower incomes. As mentioned
briefly earlier, campaign financing and the
influence of money plays a large role in the
fulfillment of political agendas. Politicians aim
to fulfill the policies of those who are able to
contribute to their campaigns. While they may
support different policy preferences, both
conservatives and liberals are culprits of extreme
campaign finance. The 2016 election saw the
most expensive campaign season in history as
spending to influence the presidential and
congressional elections led to almost $10 billion
(Price 2017). Political action committees, also
known as super PACs, can raise and spend
unlimited amounts of money supplied largely by
corporations, unions, associations, and wealthy
individuals and have reported $707 million
raised for the 2016 presidential race alone (Price
2017).
Campaign finance regulations have recently
been lifted through various Supreme Court
cases, which has led to several unfair policy
choices coming out of Congress. “Although
there are large amounts of literature, which
examine the effects of campaign finance
regulation on the behavior of political
campaigns, there are not enough [studies] that
show the potential effects of regulations on
political and policy outcomes” (Flavin 2015).
Patrick Flavin concludes by assessing that
regulations on campaign financing are one of
the most visible ways in which the federal and

state governments can level out the “political
playing field” between the rich and the poor
(Flavin 2015).
As political scientist Benjamin Page
examines the policy preferences and the role of
the wealthy in American politics, it comes to no
surprise that wealthy Americans tend to be
highly active than the typical citizen. Page agrees
with Flavin that financial contributions serve as
a catalyst by which Americans obtain a
disproportionate amount of political power. Not
only are they well-informed with current
political issues, Page finds that 99 percent of his
survey’s respondents voted in the 2008 election
while 41 percent said to have attended a
campaign speech or meeting (Page 2013).
Interestingly enough, 68 percent of the survey’s
respondents stated that they directly contributed
money to politics and 21 percent helped solicit
or bundle contribution. The author does not
seem shocked by this phenomenon. He states, it
is “little wonder that those who have the most
money give the most to politics” (Page 2013).
They get the most out of it as well.
Another reason why politicians may seek
out preferences of the affluent over the poor is
due to their overall disconnect with the public.
Patrick Fisher points out that although lowerincome citizens have differing policy preferences
from higher-income citizens, those with lowerincomes “have been historically
underrepresented in policymaking institutions”
(Fisher 2010). Fisher hypothesizes that one of
the main causes of the disconnect between
members of Congress and their constituents is
due to the “wealth gap” and the mere fact that
“members themselves are disproportionately
wealthy” (Fisher 2016). This study shows that
because Congress consists of mostly wealthy
individuals, wealthier citizens are “modestly but
significantly better reflected in choices than of
their poorer counterparts.” Although he focuses
on the representational nature of Congress itself
from the wealth perspective, he addresses that
the disproportionate representation of race is
also a factor to consider when examining policy
preferences. I will examine this point further in a
later part of this paper.
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Along the same lines, Benjamin Page
discusses another finding consistent to the
pattern previously mentioned. He states that
another possible mechanism for influence
involves “access” to, or contacts with, public
officials (Page 2013). Since the wealthy mainly
associate with other wealthy individuals, it
comes to no surprise that many donors have
personal relations with their policymakers.
When asked whether one had initiated a
contract with several types of federal
government official or their staffs, Page’s survey
reveals that about half of its respondents
reported contacted to at least one type of official.
More specifically, the survey showed that 47
percent of the respondents made at least one
contact with a congressional office. Although
less frequent, contact with White House officials
and executive agencies were also common
among interviewees. The authors note that this
is a much higher proportion than what the
general public has reported (Page 2013).

PREFERENCE GAP: HOW DOES THE
GOVERNMENT RESPOND?

To start, one should note that the “preference
gap” is different from the more commonly
known “income gap.” In his book, which studies
the various aspects of “gapology,” Patrick Fisher
defines the income gap as the “difference in the
political behavior of those with low income and
those with high income” (Fisher 2014). On the
other hand, the preference gap as Martin Gilens
examines, is the difference in the relationship
between government policy and the preferences
of high-income as opposed to low-income
(Gilens 2009). According to data by the
aforementioned political scientists, it seems as if
the preference gap is a byproduct of the income
gap. When exploring the preferences of
Americans in different income groups, Gilens
has similar data and techniques as Larry Bartels.
They find that the more privileged subgroups of
Americans have greater sway over government
policy and are far better represented than the
poor are. These preference gaps can be seen in a
wide range of issues such as taxes, trade policy,
or unemployment benefits, as well as non-

economic polices such as abortion, gay rights,
and civil liberties (Gilens 2009).
Before examining the public’s policy
preferences, one should question how public
preference data is collected and what types of
preferences it consists of. Gilens notes that one
of the difficulties in assessing public preferences
is trying to identify a “suitable collection” to
assess properly. In addition to this, the
researcher must examine both a possible and
existing policies to form proper assessment of
preferences to ascertain what could and could
not be (Gilens 2009). In his research, Gilens
focuses on the net preference gaps between high
and low income earners to establish inequalities
in government responsiveness. By using a
specific set of policy questions to represent the
range of federal government policies, he is able
to get a more accurate estimate on an average
preference gap between low- and high- income
Americans. Through the policy items observed,
including welfare items, Gilens finds that there is
a 17.8 percent preference gap. With risk of being
an outlier, welfare policies were detracted from a
first sample because of the stark difference of
preferences among income earners. In addition,
there are certain aspects in public policy such as
abortion, creationism, and stem cell research,
which inevitably all generate large preference
gaps between high- and low- income Americans
(Gilens 2009). Similar to welfare policy, the size
of the preference gap will vary from one specific
policy aspect to another. Gilens assesses his data
by concluding that public policy in the United
States would “look rather different if poor
Americans had the influence over government
policy that affluent Americans appear to enjoy
(Gilens 2009).
This study is continued in his work,
Affluence and Influence, where Martin Gilens
essentially agrees with Bartels’ theory of an
“Unequal Democracy” in the United States. In
fact, he researches how political inequality
directly relates to economic inequality (Gilens
2012). Similar to Hacker and Pierson, Gilens
believes that there are various components,
which have shaped the last several decades of
disparity. In winner-take-all politics, the role of
organized interests and business groups has a
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significant impact on the systemic rise of income
inequality (Hacker & Pierson 2010). Those with
personal interests or ties in a certain industry
have influence over many politicians’ agendas,
which in return leads to unfair policy initiatives.
Gilens believes that interest groups, parties and
elections also negatively contribute to this trend
of inequality. As a result, politicians and
institutions do not appropriately respond to the
needs of all its citizens forming a preference gap
in American politics (Gilens 2012). In his work,
he finds it imperative to look at the policy
preferences in which the rich and poor disagree
rather than those in which they agree.
One common trend found when researching
the preference gap is that regardless of the
consistency of policies preference between the
rich and the poor, “when preferences between
the well-off and the poor diverge, government
policy bears absolutely no relationship to the
degree of support of opposition among the
poor” (Gilens 2012). In other words, when the
policy preferences of the rich differentiate from
that of the poor, the government will inevitably
respond in support of the higher income group.
It is only in social welfare policies that slight
influence is seen by lower incomes due to the
support from powerful interest groups. Despite
this, interest groups do not seem to limit the
power of affluent policy decisions (Gilens 2012).
Furthermore, Gilens examines the
preference gap during presidential election years
versus non-election years. To no surprise, he
notes that presidential elections increase
government responsiveness in general, but
primarily for the poor and middle class. In
regards to the middle class, Gilens findings also
show that policymaking is responsive to the
higher-income groups, but not the middleincome group. In non-election years, he sees the
responsiveness divert back toward the wealthy
(Gilens 2012). Lastly, he explains how parties
have also negatively affected government
responsiveness toward lower income citizens. As
discussed earlier, it comes as no surprise that
those who contribute to candidates’ campaigns
have a stronger say in directing policies in
general. However, Gilens finds that regardless of
one’s affluent status, policy influence decreases

based on the majority party in office. As
previously mentioned, political parties have clear
preferences and appeal toward specific income
groups.
This hypothesis is further heightened by
specifically exploring state political parties and
representation of the poor. Authors Elizabeth
Rigby and Gerald Wright research how the poor
is affected by income inequality and the
repercussions it has on the preference gap. They
conclude that in terms of political parties and
the policymaking process, low-income citizens
are ignored regardless of party affiliation (Rigby
& Wright 2013). For example, Democratic
parties and Republican parties vary by appealing
toward specific income groups. Democratic
parties capitalize on the relative liberalism of the
wealthy on social issues, and Republican parties
benefit from the relative conservativism of the
wealthy on economic issues. In addition, Rigby
and Wright agree with Gilens and Bartels that
income inequality has an extreme effect on
responsiveness. “Where and when income
inequality is higher, parties will exhibit greater
differential responsiveness toward their incomethird constituents” (Rigby & Wright 2013).
Similar to Hacker and Pierson, they find that the
responsiveness to the affluent is most visible in
states with greater income inequality – where
economic resources are most concentrated in
the hands of the few.
While most hope that political parties in the
United States serve to link citizens with its
political institutions in order to enhance
representation of those with fewer resources, the
current campaign environment seems to provide
incentive to appeal wealthy citizens (Rigby &
Wright 2013). The preferences of citizens with
lower incomes are often kept out of political
agendas and are likely to remain off through
most legislative processes. Rigby and Wright
examine how the poor is left out early on in the
policymaking process by examining the
preferences of low-income, middle- income, and
high-income citizens. Due to the stark ideologies
of the Democratic and Republican parties, the
authors examine the parties’ stances on
economic and social issues. They look at the
relationship between each income group’s
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preferences with their party positions and
compare the results.
They examine economic issues first. With
Democratic parties, they found little alignment
between party positions and the opinion of
either low-income or middle-income citizens in
the state. Instead, the results only showed
alignment between higher income constituents
(Rigby & Wright 2013). Contrarily, Republican
parties’ economic positions are almost identical
with higher income preferences. However, there
is a different pattern for social policy issues.
They find that both Democrats and Republicans
show alignment among all three income groups
when considered alone. To bring this data
together, the authors “illustrate how, for
economic policy issues, party positions are
aligned with the preferences of the more
advantaged constituents” (Rigby & Wright
2013). However, for social issues, both parties
align with each income group. Similar to Gilens’
findings, when social issues diverge between
high and low income preferences, it is only the
more advantaged constituents who remain to be
influential to the policymaking process.
Therefore, in terms of the poor, “preferences
align only on social issues – and only when they
overlap with the preferences of the middle – or
high-income groups” of that same party (Rigby
& Wight 2013).
Lastly, in order for Rigby and Wright to
show whether responsiveness to the wealthy is
greater in states with more income inequality,
they use a cross-sectional measure of income
inequality based on market-income, pretax, and
transfer family income. In addition, they use the
Gini Coefficient in order to capture how far the
state’s income distribution deviates from perfect
equality. Their research finds that Democratic
parties varied by the level of income disparity in
the states, while Republican parties did not vary
by income inequality for economic issues or for
social issues (Rigby & Wright 2013). One reason
for this may be that concerns about high
economic inequality worsens government
responsiveness in state Democratic parties.
States with more equal distributions do not find
differential responsiveness across the three
income groups. Although, the Democratic party

positions are highly skewed toward the rich in
states with high amounts of income inequality
(Rigby & Wright 2013).
The authors analyze this trend by
understanding patterns of resource constraints
on parties. Unlike Bartels, Rigby and Wright
believe that because Republicans inherently have
a wealthier constituency base, they are able to
readily contribute and fund the party’s needs.
With this said, they feel as if Republicans have
the economic flexibility to appeal to broader
preferences of lower incomes. On the other
hand, the authors feel as though Democratic
parties are more economically constrained, and
thus, feel pressured to appeal to the policy
priorities of the wealthy (Rigby & Wright 2013).
As Rigby and Wright examine the
preferences of poor Americans, Benjamin Page
describes democracy and the policy preference
of wealthy Americans. This article relates
directly and agrees with both Gilens’ and Bartels’
works that there are significant preference gaps
between the affluent and other Americans
concerning both social and economic issues. In
order to get the most accurate information, Page
compared wealthy Americans’ responses to their
survey with the responses that the public has
given in various other polls. He finds that
affluent citizens are unsupportive of job and
income programs, raising the minimum wage,
and unemployment. In addition, they are less
willing to provide education opportunities. Most
importantly, the surveys find that that the
affluent are less willing to pay more in taxes to
provide healthcare for everyone, favor a lower
estate tax, and less eager to increase the income
tax on high income people (Page 2013). Lastly,
and the most pertinent to my research, the
wealthy oppose government action to
redistribute income or wealth in order address
the issue of economic inequality.
Here, it is important to examine in detail
the stark difference of policy preference and
priorities of wealthy Americans from those of
ordinary citizens. To start, it is interesting to
point out that 87 percent of the Page’s survey
respondents stated that budget deficits were the
“most important” problem facing the United
States. Only 4 percent felt that this was “not very
72

POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XIX · 2018

important at all” (Page 2013). Another point to
emphasize is that the survey found that 84
percent of respondents called unemployment
and education “very important” problems, but
was not considered the “most important” issue.
In regards to social issues, climate change was
regarded as “very important” by only 16 percent
of the survey’s respondents (Page 2013).
Since most of the wealthy respondents
focused on the issue of deficits, the authors
analyzed how the wealthy confront this and
other problems. There appears to be a disparity
between the wealthy and other Americans
regarding how to address specific issues such as
the deficit. The focus on deficits is not a widely
shared view by the majority of Americans. To
deal with these kind of problems, the wealthy
tend to favor spending cuts rather than tax
increases (Page 2013). These policy preferences
tend to occur at the expense of the majority of
middle and low-income Americans. In regards
to the unemployment, high-income groups favor
relying on private enterprises to amend the issue
rather than governmental income maintenance
(Page 2013). To address education, the wealthy
find it more favorable to rely on market-based
reforms while promote spending cuts for public
schools and financial assistance. One of the stark
economic difference among high and lowincome constituents is their disagreement on
spending levels (Page 2013). Page also discusses
differences among tax policies, education
policies, healthcare issues, and economic
regulations.
Since this paper discusses the relationship
between income inequality and government
responsiveness, it is important to consider how
the wealthy regard the issues of income
inequality itself. Page finds that the wealthy
respondents are aware of the high levels of
income inequality in the United States.
Surprisingly, they also agreed at the fact that
certain salaries should be adjusted in order to
make wealth distribution more equal (Page
2013). Despite this fact, the respondents did not
agree to government regulations of the
redistribution of wealth. Although they believe
that incomes should be more equal, they
evidently do not favor redistributive actions by

the government. Page finds that 87 percent of
the wealthy said that it is not the government’s
responsibility to reduce income inequalities
between the rich and the poor. Similarly, 83
percent of the respondents stated that the
government should not try to fix this problem by
amending tax policies. These percentages can be
compared to that of the general public’s opinion.
Forty six percent of the majority of Americans
stated that it is the government’s responsibility
to alleviate income inequalities, while 52 percent
also agree that it should be fixed by placing
heavy taxes on the rich (Page 2013).
In contrast to the aforementioned authors,
Stuart Soroka and Christopher Wlezien refute
the hypothesis that public preferences across
income brackets affect representation,
responsiveness and democracy. Instead, they
believe that the differences these in preferences
are in fact small and insignificant. They find that
differences are much greater across education
levels and, especially, party identification
(Soroka & Wlezien 2008). Rigby and Wright
agree that party identification has a major role in
political preferences, but they still deduce that
income inequality is the main driving factor.
Gilens disagrees with Soroka and Wlezien
entirely and through a more accurate set of data
and research questions proves that in terms of
federal policy, the affluent are far better
represented than poorer constituents are. Flavin
examines both Soroka and Wlezien with Gilens’
research and considers both of these arguments
when he researches economic inequality on
state-by-state basis.
Soroka and Wlezien refute the hypothesis
stated in this paper. They agree that there are
other factors or “sub-aggregates” that are based
on income that affect overall government
responsiveness. They discuss how education
levels as well as party identification bears some
of the burden when considering inequality in
responsiveness. Because there are many different
groups which representation could vary, Soroka
and Wlezien believe that this empirical debate
cannot be solely considered an income disparity
issue. They indicate that income only really
matters in cases that involve welfare spending
(Soroka & Wlezien 2008). Other than that,
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income levels in general play a small role in
political responsiveness.
Soroka and Wlezien conduct their research
by examining the U.S. General Social Survey
(GSS) from 1973 to 2004. They pose questions
about preference on government spending at all
levels and opinions for policy changes. However,
the questions posed in their survey are highly
contested among other political scientists. Gilens
analyzes over 1,700 different GSS survey
questions that show the gap between low- and
high-income Americans policy preferences. He
deduces that the gap is much larger and extends
much wider than what Soroka and Wlezien
suggest from the GSS questions (Gilens 2009).
He explains that the GSS data set on spending
items is “too broad in nature”; whereas the
question in Gilens’ data set tend to be more
specific. If questions are too broad, it may
“obscure the existing differences in policy
preferences within policy domains” (Gilens
2009).
Therefore, Soroka and Wlezien do not
accurately represent the size or distribution of
the preference gap among high and low income
constituents. It has been proven that preferences
across income groups do differ by a significant
amount on a variety of issues and therefore,
Gilens concludes that the affluent have a
significant amount of influence over
government policy. If the rich and the poor were
to switch roles in this case, it is clear that public
policy would come to look much different in the
United States (Gilens 2009).
As already discussed, government
representation is a key component of any
democratic system. In a country like the United
States, public opinion can vary greatly from state
to state. Similar to many public issues, income
inequality varies in almost every state or region.
If income inequality and government
responsiveness are linked, it is clear that
government responses will vary from state to
state as well. Patrick Flavin examines income
inequality and policy representation in each state
to help better understand and explain Bartels
concept of “unequal democracy”. (Flavin 2011).
Like Gilens, Flavin agrees that income disparities
are a driving factor when faced with equal

representation. In addition, he pays attention to
the question, “Are citizens’ opinions represented
equally?” Like Bartels and Gilens, he agrees that
the opinions of the poor are underrepresented in
political institutions. He uses the differences in
citizens’ opinions and public policies across the
American states to examine whether state
governments respond to their citizens as
political equals – specifically citizens with low
incomes (Flavin 2011).
Flavin extends this research to each of the
American states, which reveals similar results. In
his findings, he uncovers that the opinions of
citizens in the middle-and high-income groups
are represented in state public policies, but the
poor is still seen to be consistently
underrepresented (Flavin 2011). In order for a
democracy to function properly, constituents are
to be considered as equals in the realm of
politics; however, it is clear that the American
system fall short of this imperative standard.
Flavin heightens Bartels’ hypothesis in Unequal
Democracy by showing that unequal
representation also applies to the ideologies of
state policies. In addition, this trend is also seen
among social and economic issues across the
United States. Flavin concludes by mentioning
that most studies of unequal representation fall
short of explaining exactly “why these disparities
occur” in the first place. He believes that in order
to fully understand the causes of unequal
political influences, studies should explain why it
occurs to begin with (Flavin 2011).

RACE AND INEQUALITY

Lastly, it is important to consider race when
describing any type of inequality. Rodney Hero
and Morris Levy discuss the racial structure of
economic inequality in the United States.
Specifically, it examines the issues of income
inequality in relation to race. The central
question of the authors’ analysis asks how the
structure of inequality by race has changed in an
era of rapidly rising levels of income inequality
(Hero & Levy 2016). News stories about income
inequality often look past the issue of race
despite the fact that economic disparities
between racial groups plays a substantial role in
its effects. The authors also mention Larry
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Bartels work, Unequal Democracy and criticize
that it does not mention or acknowledge the
influence of race. They hypothesize that the
sharp rise in income inequality in the United
States since the 1970s cannot be viewed as a
solely economic or “class” phenomenon: instead,
racial inequality must also be embedded within
rising income inequality (Hero & Levy 2016).
This research compares racial structures and
inequality between social classes. When
considering race and income inequality there are
two ways to characterize the differences. Hero
and Levy discuss “within-group inequality” and
“between-group inequality.” Within-group is the
total income inequality between individual who
are members of well-defined groups, such as
whites or males. Between-group inequality is the
total amount of inequality between individuals
from various groups, such as between blacks and
whites (Hero & Levy 2016). Not all income
inequality can be considered the same. Although
two different societies may obtain the same
levels of income inequality, the authors show
that it is necessary to note the biographical
makeup of the population in order to
understand the degree to which income
differences between groups account for total
inequality (Hero & Levy 2016).
Hero and Levy conclude that race is key
factor when examining inequality. With this
said, it is important to note that income divides
between racial groups accounted for a larger
share of total inequality in 2010 than it did in
1980, which shows that a “between-race”
dimension of inequality has kept pace nationally
(Hero & Levy 2016). Since racial inequalities
have held firm with the rise of total income
inequality at the national level, it is clear that this
racial aspect is not just a simple byproduct of
inequality, but a central component to it (Hero
& Levy 2016).
This racial component is furthered through
Richard Harvey Brown’s “A Peculiar
Democracy: Race, Class, and Corporate Power.”
In this chapter of his book, he examines the
recent trend in American inequality in politics.
He notes that although the United States is the
world’s third highest income per person, about
19 percent of the population lives below the

national poverty line (Brown 2005). In addition,
he examines the historical exclusion of African
Americans, which has led to the racial
inequalities in both modernization and
economics. Through Brown’s research he sees
the creation of the black middle and professional
classes and its expansion in recent decades, but
continues to note that their conditions “of the
lower strata have stagnated or declined
compared to those of white Americans” (Brown
2005). It is evident that income inequality must
be viewed in a different perspective for blacks
and other minorities than when examining it to
the white population.

CONCLUSION

As proven throughout this paper, the political
role of the wealthy has become a prominent
concern for the democratic values of this
country. Given the central importance of money
in the various aspects of politics, it has become
almost inevitable to maintain a proper
democracy while giving equal political voice to
all American citizens. This paper concludes that
there is a direct link between income inequality
and government responsiveness by politicians
and institutions. Policy preferences of the poor
are underrepresented in all aspects of American
politics. There has been a consistent rise of
income inequality, which is the growing gap
between the rich and the poor. More specifically,
the United States’ top 1 percent has consistently
seen itself pull away from the rest, while the
majority of the population remains stagnant.
Political scientists have characterized the
United States as an “Unequal Democracy” as
Larry Bartels put it, where the political system is
piloted through unequal voices. Hacker and
Pierson take it a step further and show how the
American democracy has become an arena for
“Winner-Take-All,” where the rich become
richer. By examining the political preferences
and attitude of both high- and low-income
citizens, political scientists are able to better
understand what causes the unequal
responsiveness by the government. Whether
there are sub-aggregate groups such as education
and party affiliations that affect these outcomes,
75

POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XIX · 2018

the research has proven to show that income is
at the base of inequality.
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